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I’LL TAKE THE BENEFITS IF YOU PAY THE COSTS: 
WEIGHING THE EQUITIES OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
FUNDING SOURCES FOR HYDROELECTRIC DAM 
DECOMMISSIONING 
Dominique R. Scalia* 
“All the rivers run into the sea; yet the sea is not full…” Ecclesiastes 1:7 
INTRODUCTION 
The passage of the Federal Water Power Act in 19201 marked the 
beginning of Congress’ commitment to private development of 
hydroelectric power on navigable rivers.2  Licenses for hydroelectric dams3 
were authorized, and “[u]tilities responded by investing in hydro. In the 
next five decades, public and private reservoir storage capacity grew from 
about forty million acre feet to 450 million acre feet.”4  In the zeal to take 
advantage of this opportunity, both public and private entities have built 
many dams that have created a host of detrimental impacts on their 
environments.  These dams have negatively affected water quality, flood 
patterns, and the habitats of threatened and endangered wildlife, such as 
the many varieties of salmon that once occupied Washington’s Elwha 
River in abundance.5  In some of these cases, it has since been 
determined that the costs (including non-economic environmental costs) of 
continued dam operation are greater than the benefits, and that the dams 
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1
 It became part of the Federal Power Act in 1935. 
2
 Dan Tarlock, Hydro Law and the Future of Hydroelectric Power Generation in the 
United States, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1723, 1731 (2012). 
3
 These dams produce power by allowing the gravitational force of falling water to turn 
the blades of a turbine in an electric generator (where in coal or nuclear power plants, it is 
steam that turns the turbine). 
4
 Tarlock supra note 2 at 732. 
5
 See generally DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR ET AL., THE ELWHA REPORT: RESTORATION OF THE 
ELWHA RIVER ECOSYSTEM & NATIVE ANADROMOUS FISHERIES (1994) [hereinafter ELWHA 
REPORT], available at https://archive.org/details/elwhareportresto94nati (last visited Mar. 
8, 2014). 






should be removed.6  Once that determination is made, the question 
arises: who pays for dam decommissioning?7 
The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) oversees the 
licensing of non-federal hydroelectric dams under authority granted 
through the Federal Power Act (FPA).  Within FERC’s authority is the 
ability to deny renewal to the expired license of an existing dam, or to 
impose such weighty conditions on a renewal that the dam owner cannot 
afford to accept the new license.8  The question of who pays for the 
consequences of an expired license, however, continues to lack a 
consistent answer.  The FPA, in its present condition, fails to create 
reliable expectations about the distribution of expenses for the removal of 
hydroelectric dams and the restoration of affected river systems.  As a 
result, cost distributions are formulated on a piece-meal basis, with 
government entities making substantial contributions to total costs, but at 
widely varying rates.9  The question thus becomes: who should pay for 
dam decommissioning?  
Hydroelectric dam owners enjoy up to fifty years per license term10 
of revenue generated by their free use of a river’s kinetic energy, along 
with public subsidies like tax credits for renewable energy.11  The idea that 
a dam may have a detrimental impact on its environment is not particularly 
new.  Even in 1834, communities protested the construction of a new dam 
                                                             
6
 See generally AM. RIVERS ET AL., DAM REMOVAL SUCCESS STORIES: RESTORING RIVERS 
THROUGH SELECTIVE REMOVAL OF DAMS THAT DON’T MAKE SENSE xii et seq. (1999) 
[hereinafter SUCCESS STORIES], available at 
http://www.sustainourgreatlakes.org/Portals/0/pdf/General/SuccessStoriesReport.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 8, 2014). 
7
 Use of the term “decommissioning” in this paper refers to the entire process of shutting 
down operations, removing the dam, and conducting environmental restoration efforts.  
8
 See City of Tacoma, Washington v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 460 F.3d 53, 74 
(D.C. Cir. 2006). 
9
 See generally AM. RIVERS, PAYING FOR DAM REMOVAL: A GUIDE TO SELECTED FUNDING 
SOURCES (2000) [hereinafter PAYING FOR DAM REMOVAL], available at 
http://www.michigandnr.com/publications/pdfs/Fishing/dams/Paying-Dam-Removal.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 8, 2014). 
10
 16 U.S.C. § 799 (2006). 
11
 For example, Section 1301 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 extended tax credits to 
existing hydroelectric facilities that made efficiency improvements or additions to 
capacity.  26 U.S.C. § 45(c)(8) (2006). 






on the Kennebec River in Augusta, Maine for fear that it would destroy 
wild fish habitat.12  The Edwards Dam was built anyway, caused an 
abundance of harm, and later became the first dam removed by order of 
FERC for the purpose of restoring fisheries (in 1999).13  
Understanding of the impacts of dams on their environments has 
only grown since the Edwards Dam was built. Some dams also 
detrimentally impact cultural resources, such as by flooding sites sacred to 
local Native American tribes.14 Lawmakers and administrators are more 
frequently considering alternatives to re-licensure of existing dams, and 
dam removal has become an increasingly viable option.15  Ultimately, that 
a license term is limited, and that FERC has the sole authority to grant or 
deny re-licensure is information readily available to all dam owners and 
potential dam owners.  Under the FPA, an unlicensed hydroelectric dam is 
a trespasser,16 even if it is has ceased to operate,17 and the expectation 
                                                             
12
 A Brief History of Edwards Dam, NATURAL RES.’S COUNCIL OF ME., 
http://www.nrcm.org/projects-hot-issues/healthy-waters/edwards-dam-and-kennebec-
restoration/a-brief-history-of-edwards-dam/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2014). 
13
 See Jeff Crane, “Setting the river free”: The removal of the Edwards dam and the 
restoration of the Kennebec River, 1 WATER HIST. 131, 131 (2009). 
14
 For example, the Tellico Dam on the Little Tennessee River flooded a site known to 
local bands of the Cherokee Nation as a religious birthplace, as well as an ancient capital 
and sanctuary. See Mark S. Cohen, American Indian Sacred Religious Sites and 
Government Development: A Conventional Analysis in an Unconventional Setting, 85 
MICH. L. REV. 771, 783-84 (1987). 
15
 The most recent information from American Rivers indicates that more than 925 dams 
have been removed in the United States over the last 100 years. Questions About 
Removing Dams, AM. RIVERS, http://www.americanrivers.org/initiatives/dams/faqs/ (last 
visited Mar. 8, 2014).  According to the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers National Inventory 
of Dams (NID), the last five years alone have seen removal of approximately 200 dams 
solely in the category they have designated “high hazard potential.” National Inventory of 
Dams Overview, NID DATA TEAM, 22 (2013), available at 
http://geo.usace.army.mil/pgis/NID2009.downloadFile?InFileName=NIDoverview10May2
013.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2014) [hereinafter NID OVERVIEW]. This category accounts for 
less than seventeen percent of all dams included in the NID.  Id. at 9.  The 200 removals 
account for approximately 1.4 percent of the dams categorized as having high hazard 
potential. Id. 
16
 A license is required in order to “construct, operate, or maintain” a dam and other 
project works for the purposes of developing power.  16 U.S.C. § 817(1) (2006). 
17
 Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Pend Oreille Cnty., Washington, 124 FERC 61064 (July 18, 
2008). 






for that unlicensed dam therefore should be simple: it must be removed at 
the owner’s expense.  
This article discusses the current state of dam decommissioning, 
and provides an analysis of the costs and benefits of placing financial 
liability on various parties.  Upon weighing those equities, the fairest 
solution is for dam owners to take on the costs of future decommissioning.  
Moving forward, Congress should require FERC to place explicit 
expectations on dam owners and create a consistent program of cost 
bearing for private entities.  Dam project owners receiving new or renewed 
licenses should—as a condition of the license—be required to 
demonstrate ability and commitment to paying the full costs of removing 
the dam and restoring the river in the future event that the license is not 
renewed. 
This article is not a referendum on dams.  It does not contain a 
cost/benefit analysis of any particular dam, or suggest that any dam 
should be removed.  Every dam is unique—as is every river—and the 
decision to decommission a hydroelectric project is destined to be a 
complex one that accounts for factors that this article could not hope to 
address.  With that said, dams are man-made structures with finite 
lifespans.  The day will undoubtedly come for each18 when the costs of its 
continued operation—both monetary and non-monetary—will no longer be 
justified by the benefits.  When that day comes, someone will foot the bill 
for removing the dam; and hopefully someone will also foot the bill for 
restoring the river on which it resided.  This proposal is an answer to the 
question of who that someone should be. 
Part I of this article provides background information to 
contextualize both the scope and importance of this proposal.  Part II 
explains the present condition of the law surrounding hydroelectric dam 
decommissioning.  Part III evaluates the equities between public and 
private funding for decommissioning projects, responding to potential 
counter-arguments and drawing a comparison to the environmental costs 
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 I am making what I think is a safe assumption that no built structure will stand literally 
forever.  To the extent that some dam might truly be repaired in perpetuity, feel free to 
take this as hyperbole. 






of mining activities.  Finally, Part IV explains why the ultimate goal of a 
new lawmaking process governing funding for dam decommissioning 
should be the requirement that private owners bear the full costs of both 
removal and restoration. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Dams Versus the Environment 
Though it is not the purpose of this article to promote dam removal 
in its own right, some understanding of the environmental impact of dams 
is helpful in seeing the importance of removal of those dams that have 
outlived their usefulness.  The presence of a dam affects its river’s 
ecosystem at all levels. Physical alteration of the river caused by dams 
and their resulting reservoirs can directly cause the destruction of habitats 
and plant-life, in addition to the degradation of water quality and changes 
to water yield.19  In part due to rotting vegetation, reservoirs “may account 
for between 1 percent and 28 percent of the global warming potential of 
[greenhouse gas] emissions.”20  Changes in water flow cause varied water 
temperature, which in turn can decrease the presence of native fish 
populations.21  Fish are also harmed by increased concentration of gasses 
near a dam’s spillway, diseases from non-native species that are invited 
by the newly changed environment, loss of habitat due to the reduction of 
downstream sediment, and the physical barrier to migration of the dam 
itself.22  Similarly dramatic impacts can also be seen throughout the river’s 
floodplain, affecting riparian forests, agricultural lands, and the animals 
living there.23  
These tremendous impacts on the environment surrounding a dam 
are no less significant for the people nearby. One poignant example is the 
Elwha S’Klallam tribe, who  
                                                             
19
 See THE WORLD COMM’N ON DAMS, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR 
DECISION-MAKING 75 (2000), available at http://www.internationalrivers.org/files/attached-
files/world_commission_on_dams_final_report.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2014). 
20
 Id. at 75-77. 
21
 Id. at 78-79. 
22
 Id. at 80-82. 
23
 Id. at 83. 






lived in and utilized the Elwha River basin for thousands of 
years. Villages and fish camps, archaeological treasures, 
traditional cultural properties, tribal history and tribal culture 
are all integrally connected to the watershed and river 
system. Because it was the heart of the culture and the 
economy, the whole river is a cultural resource.24  
When the Elwha and Glines Canyon Dams were built in 1913 and 1927, 
they blocked fish migration and flooded traditional fishing grounds.25  “The 
majority of [the Tribe’s] known archaeological and ethnographic resources 
[were] … either inundated or buried by the silt that . . . accumulated 
behind the dams.”26  The ongoing process of removing both the Elwha and 
Glines Canyon Dams has begun to restore both the fisheries and the 
cultural resources that were lost to the projects.27 
B. Prevalence of Hydroelectric Amongst All U.S. Dams 
Of all the dams in the United States that may be posing 
environmental hazards, very few actually have the added benefit of 
producing renewable energy.  There are at least 87,359 dams in the 
United States,28 not including small dams that do not meet the minimum 
size requirements to be included in the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers’ 
National Inventory of Dams (NID).29  Only 2,209 of the dams in NID are 
                                                             
24
 ELWHA REPORT, supra note 5, at 20.  Do not be mislead by the Secretary’s use of past 
tense in this report; the Tribe is still living along the Elwha and remains heavily involved in 
restoration. 
25
 Id. at 9-10. 
26
 Id. at 122. 
27
 For an ongoing account of the restoration process, see Dam Removal Blog, NAT’L 
PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/olym/naturescience/damremovalblog.htm (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2014). 
28
 It is also worth noting that new dam construction has been on the decline since the 
1960s.  Of the total dams catalogued in NID, 19,768 (22.6 percent) were completed 
between 1960 and 1969.  NAT’L INVENTORY OF DAMS, 
http://geo.usace.army.mil/pgis/f?p=397:5:0::NO (last visited Apr. 1, 2014).  Since that 
time, completions have declined every decade.  Id.  While this suggests that the scope of 
the issue is becoming more finite, it also indicates that we are currently—five decades 
after the peak years for dam completions—facing the height of re-licensure applications. 
29
 NAT’L INVENTORY OF DAMS, 
http://geo.usace.army.mil/pgis/f?p=397:1:1474693368669801::NO::: (last visited Dec. 8, 
2013) [hereinafter NID].  The NID includes dams that are at least twenty-five feet in 






used primarily for hydroelectric power30—about 2.5 percent.  American 
Rivers estimates that only about 2,300 dams are subject to FERC 
regulation.31  For dams not governed by FERC, most are regulated by the 
states in which they are located.32  Given that lack of centralized oversight 
for non-FERC dams, a focus on hydroelectric projects provides an avenue 
for change that would affect dams and rivers nationwide.  Admittedly, that 
means the proposal would affect a relatively small percentage of all dams 
within the United States.  There is no reason, however, that similar 
schemes could not be enacted at the state-level in order to encompass a 
greater percentage of the dams that may ultimately be removed. 
C. Three Stages of a License 
There are three stages of dam licensing that each present a 
different set of equities: pre-license, existing license, and license renewal.  
First, for dam projects that exist only in concept, and for which owners are 
seeking a new original license, the imposition of new requirements creates 
relatively few equitable concerns.  Because there is no reliable funding 
scheme, there are no relied-upon expectations of public support or federal 
funding assistance that cause this proposal to seem particularly unfair.  
                                                                                                                                                                      
height with more than fifteen acre-feet of storage, or more than six feet in height with at 
least fifty acre-feet of storage.  It also includes smaller dams if they have “high” or 
“significant” hazard classifications. NID.  The total number of dams, including smaller 
dams not included in NID, is likely very high. The National Research Council estimated in 
1992 that there were over 2.5 million dams in the United States.  NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, 
RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND PUBLIC POLICY 26 
(1992). 
30
 NID, supra note 29, at NID National. 
31
 SUCCESS STORIES, supra note 6.  Note that only dams used to produce hydroelectric 
power are subject to FERC’s regulatory authority, though there is no requirement that 
hydroelectric power be the only or even the primary purpose of the dam.  This would 
mean that more than the 2,209 dams used primarily for hydroelectric power would fall 
under FERC’s authority.  However, FERC oversees only non-federal dam projects, 
meaning that some of those 2,209 dams would also be excluded.  According to NID, 
sixty-five percent of the inventoried dams are privately owned.  NID OVERVIEW, supra note 
15, at 11. 
32
 Dam Safety Regulation in the U.S., ASS’N OF ST. DAM SAFETY OFFICIALS, 
http://www.damsafety.org/news/?p=95446bff-9706-419b-917e-f0758fc37e74 (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2014). However, American Rivers notes that under the varying state regulatory 
schemes, many dams remain entirely unregulated due to such disqualifications as small 
size.  See SUCCESS STORIES supra note 6, at xi. 






The explicit requirement of decommissioning funding will simply be one of 
many prospective conditions on the license.  This proposal should 
therefore apply to pre-license projects with full force. 
Second, for mid-stream dam projects with existing unexpired 
licenses, a new requirement for decommissioning funds would be 
especially hard to swallow.  The requirement would alter the agreed-upon 
terms of the existing license, and may be viewed as an unfair revocation 
by dam owners who find themselves financially unable to meet the new 
condition.  Although I do think the imposition of funding requirements on 
existing licensees is defensible, I do not include it in this proposal.  Such 
legislation would surely be more difficult to pass, and it hardly seems 
necessary when so many licenses are already facing expiration.33  
Third, for the group seeking license renewal, this new requirement 
would be the most difficult.  These dams were built as many as fifty years 
ago,34 and have operated for that long without any expectation that 
owners would be required to fully fund decommissioning in the future.  
Owners long ago selected the location they thought would be the most 
economically viable, and the imposition of this requirement would change 
that balance too late for another choice to be made.  But as I will argue 
below, any expectation by a dam owner that their license would be 
perpetually renewed is not reasonable.  Licenses are granted for set terms 
not exceeding fifty years,35 and any cost/benefit analysis conducted on the 
original investment should have at least taken into account the possibility 
that there would be no renewal.  For that reason, and the others set forth 
below, this proposal should be fully applied to expired licenses seeking 
renewal. 
II. THE END OF A LICENSE 
 The FPA primarily governs initial licensing and includes relatively 
little contemplation of the post-license life of a dam and its river.  It does, 
at least implicitly, allow FERC to deny re-licensure directly, or to shut 
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 See NAT’L INVENTORY OF DAMS supra note 28. 
34
 Or even longer, for dams that are currently receiving annual licenses during a 
prolonged renewal process. 
35
 16 U.S.C. § 799 (2006). 






down projects indirectly by imposing conditions on a license that would 
cause its rejection by the project owner.36  But the actual procedure for 
decommissioning a dam that is subject to this kind of decision on the part 
of FERC is not predetermined by the statute or FERC’s regulations—
hence the historic lack of consistency with regard to funding.37 
The most relevant section of the FPA to the post-license life of a 
dam is the provision for condemnation by a government.38  Rather than 
producing a bill to the project owner for the government’s subsequent 
efforts in dealing with the dam, this process requires the licensee be 
compensated for the government take-over.39  It is possible that cost 
sharing for restoration could be imposed on the licensee in this situation, 
but that is not a settled question.40  There is one situation, however, in 
which FERC regulations do require restoration by a licensee: voluntary 
surrender of a license for a dam that was built on “the lands of the United 
States.”41  This is a limited circumstance, both because voluntary 
surrender is only one of several ways that a license can end, and because 
it fails to capture dams built on private lands.42  Given the already limited 
scope of FERC’s authority, small and specific provisions like this one are 
inadequate43 and this proposal seeks a much more comprehensive 
solution. 
                                                             
36
 City of Tacoma, Washington v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 460 F.3d 53, 74 
(D.C. Cir. 2006).  The FPA also allows revocation of a current license under limited 
circumstances.  16 U.S.C. § 799 (2006). 
37
 See PAYING FOR DAM REMOVAL, supra note 9. 
38




 City of Tacoma, Washington v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 460 F.3d at 74. 
41
 18 C.F.R. § 6.2 (2012).  
42
 The phrase “lands of the United States” is not specifically defined, but appears to 
include lands held in trust for Indian tribes.  See, e.g., Lake Superior District Power 
Company, Project No. 1440, Order Granting Application for Surrender of License, 59 
F.P.C. 1497 (Aug. 3, 1977).  The most frequent use of this provision is for dams located 
within a National Forest.  See, e.g., Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Pend Oreille County, 
Washington, 142 FERC 62232 (Mar. 22, 2013). 
43
 This is especially true given the reality that some dam owners come to surrender a 
license in the face of insolvency, and therefore cannot practically be compelled to pay 
restoration costs despite the single provision that may other require it.  See, e.g., Sales 
Hydro Associates, 86 FERC 61101 (Feb. 2, 1999). 






Ultimately, there remain many licensees that do not bear the full 
costs of removal and restoration when their dams are decommissioned.  
Precise information about dam removal funding packages is hard to come 
by.44  But, in one case study of twenty-five dam removals,45 American 
Rivers found that “federal and state governments together provided over 
fifty-eight percent of the total costs for each dam removal across all the 
projects studied.”46  Not all of the dams in the study were privately owned, 
so it is not possible to know exactly how much public funding went into 
private projects.47  However, it is clear that each funding package studied 
was unique, and that negotiation about funding amongst all 
stakeholders—both public and private—remains an important step in the 
decommissioning process under current practices.48 
III. EVALUATING THE EQUITIES 
A. The Cost of Dam Removal 
As a prelude, keep in mind that it is impossible to answer the 
question, “how much does it cost to decommission a dam?”  As noted by 
American Rivers, the total cost will include much more than the mere 
process of demolition.49  There are also potentially large expenses 
associated with project planning and analysis (including surveys, 
                                                             
44
 PAYING FOR DAM REMOVAL, supra note 9, at 17. 
45
 SUCCESS STORIES, supra note 6.  The organization cautions against using the data for 
more than general observations,” given the small sample size. PAYING FOR DAM REMOVAL, 
supra note 9, at 17. 
46
 PAYING FOR DAM REMOVAL, supra note 9, at 18. 
47
 It may also be the case that even private funding for certain dam removal projects 
comes at an expense to governments, by way of settlement agreements in which the 
private funder receives certain benefits for removing the dam.  For example, upriver dam 
owners and a downstream shipbuilder funded removal of the Edwards Dam on the 
Kennebec River; but in exchange, the upriver dam owners received delay in their own 
fish passage obligations and the shipbuilder received mitigation for expanded operations.  
SUCCESS STORIES, supra note 6, at 61. 
48
 Washington’s Elwha River provides an interesting (though as always, not widely 
representative) example of the negotiation process for dam removal.  This removal was 
affected not through a FERC relicensing application, but by an act of Congress. In 1992, 
Congress passed the Elwha River Ecosystem and Fisheries Restoration Act, which 
allowed up to $29.5 million dollars to be provided for the acquisition and removal of both 
the Elwha and Glines Canyon dam projects, along with environmental restoration of the 
Elwha River.  Pub. L. No.102-495, 106 Stat. 3173 § 3(b) (Jan. 3, 1992). 
49
 PAYING FOR DAM REMOVAL, supra note 9, at 22 et seq. 






ecological impact evaluation, sediment analysis, design and engineering, 
and required permits), field work (including the deconstruction, but also 
sediment management, infrastructure repair and replacement, site 
restoration, and historic and archaeological monitoring and 
documentation), and subsequent monitoring.50  The cost of this work will 
surely vary widely from project to project.  Even the cost of removal itself 
is difficult to predict.  Examining twenty-three of the dams studied by 
American Rivers in 1999,51 the highest cost of removal for any of the 
projects was about $5 million.52  The lowest was $14,551.53  The average 
cost of removal for the twenty-three dams was $850,138.54  Suffice it to 
say, the total costs of dam decommissioning will be heavily dependent on 
the unique characteristics of the dam, the river, and the overall plan 
(including method of dam demolition and the amount of restoration that 
will be performed). 
That the cost of decommissioning a dam is so unpredictable can be 
a frightening prospect.  Telling a potential new dam builder that they will 
have to pay a largely unknowable amount of money at a largely 
unknowable future date might seem unfair.  We may fear that placing that 
burden on a potential new project will deter the would-be owner from 
building the dam to begin with.  Or, we may fear that the owner will build 
the dam anyway, and ultimately shirk its responsibility in the end.  All of 
these are legitimate concerns. None of these are sufficient reasons not to 
impose responsibility on dam owners through a legislative requirement 
that they pay these costs at the end of a dam’s life in order to obtain a new 
or renewed license. 




 See generally SUCCESS STORIES, supra note 6.  Two of the projects in the report are 
not included in my analysis because they were not complete at the time the study was 
published. One project is not included because the cost of removal was unknown.  One 
project is not included because it encompassed removal of several project works without 
distinct costs. In addition, the 1973 removal of the Fort Edward Dam in New York was not 
included because American Rivers did not count this removal as a “success.”  It was 
included in an appendix to provide dam removal lessons. 
52
 All figures have been adjusted for inflation. See infra Appendix I for inflation adjustment 
calculations on all 23 projects. 
53
 See infra Appendix I.  
54
 See infra Appendix I. 






B. Requiring Payment of Unpredictable Costs is Not Unfair: 
It’s Unavoidable 
To place a new requirement on existing and potential dam owners 
that they agree to pay an unknown cost in the future may strike those 
owners as inherently unfair. A dam licensee would be required to agree to 
a condition that it could not possibly understand in its entirety—something 
that may look unconscionable in certain contexts.  How can the dam 
owner negotiate its position and evaluate its investment when the terms 
being imposed by FERC cannot be quantified? 
The answer may just have to be that the dam owner will embark 
upon its venture with less certainty.  The cost of decommissioning the 
dam—and when that might happen—is simply unknowable.  But it isn’t 
just unknowable to the dam owner; it’s unknowable to us all.  In fact, a 
current or potential dam owner is in the best possible position of any 
stakeholder to evaluate these issues.  It knows more than anyone about 
what its own project costs are likely to be.  The dam owner has the best 
available information about what the operation of the dam will look like 
after it is built, including how much power will be generated and how much 
it can charge for that power.  It knows its own plans for maintaining the 
dam, meaning it has the best information about how safe the dam will be 
and how long it will last.  If the dam owner is told that in the future it must 
pay to decommission the dam, it can prepare for that certainty by setting 
money aside, charging higher rates, or choosing not to build the dam at 
all. 
If requiring a dam owner to commit to future payment for 
decommissioning is unfair, it is even less fair not to do so.  Failing to 
impose this requirement on dam owners across the board means that a 
burden is being placed on other parties who have even less information 
about the dam than the dam owner.   That includes any government, non-
profit corporation, and individual taxpayer that will ultimately share the 
costs for decommissioning.55  Not only do these parties have access to 
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 American Rivers provides a long list of possible funding sources for dam removals.  
PAYING FOR DAM REMOVAL, supra note 9, at 5 et seq.  It includes grants from federal and 
state programs, general budgets of agencies, and specific appropriations of federal and 






less information than the dam owner (or at least no more) when the dam 
was built, but they didn’t even know that they should expect to be faced 
with any cost for decommissioning—because there is currently no 
predictable scheme for funding that process. 
Imposing a condition at the very beginning of the license regarding 
payment for decommissioning is not really a change.  As it stands, the 
grant of a new or renewed license already carries with it the eventuality 
that decommissioning will be required at some unknown cost.  Currently, 
that burden is placed on an ever-changing mixture of many public and 
private entities.  They have no idea how much they will ultimately pay, or 
even whether they will pay anything.  This proposal solidifies expectations 
as much as is possible by placing the burden on the one party in the best 
position to quantify and prepare for it. 
C. If the Conditions Leads to Fewer Dams, That’s Okay 
Industry and business interests opposing new restrictions or 
requirements may argue in the form of this threat: if you make my 
business less appealing, I’ll just get out of it.  This may be accompanied 
by some prediction of harm to a community, like fewer jobs, or perhaps in 
this case, less of that good, cheap hydropower.  Dam owners may argue 
that some hydroelectric projects are already bordering on non-profitability, 
and that the imposition of new expenses like the one proposed here would 
make more dams less likely to ever be built.  The World Commission on 
Dams might support that argument, with indications that many dam 
projects are subject to large cost overruns in construction, and that many 
fail to meet profit goals.56 
By and large, there is no great retort to this argument.  It is true that 
imposing this condition could possibly deter some would-be dam owners 
from building new projects. But while hydroelectric power is a useful 
component of our overall energy portfolio, this doesn’t mean we should 
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files/world_commission_on_dams_final_report.pdf (last visited Apr. 1, 2014). 






accept the present condition of decommissioning cost sharing in order to 
maximize the existence of dams. From January through September 2013, 
hydroelectric power accounted for about seven percent of total power 
generated in all sectors (residential, commercial, industrial, and 
transportation) in the United States.57  That is thirty-six percent of the 
energy from renewable sources, which in total provided nineteen percent 
of energy from all sources. 58  Although hydroelectric is the top energy 
source among the renewables, it is far from the only. 
If the imposition of this condition makes a particular dam project 
appear non-viable, then it is because the projected costs for that dam 
have become more accurate.  Failing to impose responsibility on dam 
owners from the beginning of a license doesn’t mean that the cost doesn’t 
exist; it merely means it isn’t being included in that owner’s evaluation of 
the potential costs and benefits of the project.  The current scheme allows 
dam investors to ignore significant risks and costs during initial 
assessments of project viability.  Those investors should be required to 
evaluate all of the burdens and plan for decommissioning from the outset.  
That requirement might mean a dam does not get built, but perhaps that’s 
because it shouldn’t be built.  
D. Do Not Be Deterred By a Threat of Corporate 
Misbehavior 
While licensees might agree to a vague requirement for 
decommissioning in the distant future, it is another thing to actually pay 
the bill when it comes due.  We may be afraid that a corporation facing 
massive expenses—and no more profits—will cut and run.  Maybe the 
corporation will dissolve, leaving no one to be held accountable.  Or 
maybe it will just file for bankruptcy after spending fifty years distributing 
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its profits, leaving insufficient funds to properly remove the dam and 
restore the environment. 
To some extent, the law already provides safety nets for situations 
like these.  Laws governing corporations prohibit various forms of 
misbehavior, create rules governing dissolution, and even allows 
individual liability of owners in certain cases (e.g. fraud).59  Bankruptcy law 
provides for recuperation of payments made to defraud creditors, or within 
a certain amount of time prior to filing for bankruptcy protection.60  And to 
whatever extent existing law does not protect against bad behavior by 
dam owners that would allow them to avoid their liabilities for 
decommissioning expenses, it should.61  New legislation providing for this 
proposed requirement could add such protections (for example, by 
creating some manner of priority status in a bankruptcy, or requiring 
individual liability for decommissioning).62  Or, such protections could be 
separately considered as corporate and bankruptcy laws evolve.  In either 
case, there is no reason that a fear of bad behavior by dam owners should 
deter us from creating a reliable scheme of funding for decommissioning. 
Further, the opportunity to avoid liability—by way of dissolution, 
bankruptcy, or otherwise—could be minimized by requiring financial 
assurance greater than a mere promise.  A dam licensee can be required 
to pay a bond, obtain insurance, or otherwise demonstrate actual ability to 
pay.  Such a system would bring this proposal in line with some of the 
more successful environmental regulations already in place for other 
industries, as discussed in the following section with regard to mining.  
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E. A Comparison: Mine Decommissioning Bonds 
Requiring financial assurances from parties in a position to cause 
environmental harm is not a new concept.  Such assurances are already 
required in a variety of settings: e.g. ships carrying hazardous cargo, 
nuclear power plants, and mines.63  This is, at least in part, a response to 
the very concerns discussed in the previous section: evasion of 
obligations by bankruptcy, dissolution, or simple abandonment.64  
Prospective liability like that proposed here is well positioned to address 
these concerns by creating expectations early on, and hopefully deterring 
excess environmental damage that would reduce restoration costs down 
the road65 (as opposed to retroactive liability, which faces various 
problems66). 
The need for environmental restoration—and the desirability of 
ensuring it is paid for through prospective assurances—can be seen in the 
effects of mining.  Visit Butte, Montana, for example, and you cannot help 
but notice that massive Superfund site knows as the Berkeley Pit—a 
former open-pit copper mine that operated from 1955 to 1982.67  In 
addition to, arguably, being a terrible eyesore, the pit is now filled with 
toxic waste that was even blamed for the death of 342 migrating snow 
geese that had the misfortune of landing upon it.68   
Congress addressed a different sector of the mining industry in 
1977 by passing the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act 
(SMCRA), bolstered by the powerful images of long-burning mine fires, 
the Buffalo Creek mining disaster, and the ubiquitous landslides and acid 
                                                             
63
 JAMES BOYD, FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL OBLIGATIONS: ARE BONDING 
AND ASSURANCE RULES FULFILLING THEIR PROMISE? 2 (2001), available at 






 See id. at 9, 34-35. 
67
 Berkeley Pit, MONT. OFFICIAL ST. TRAVEL SITE (2010), 
http://visitmt.com/listing/categories_NET/MoreInfo.aspx?IDRRecordID=11138 (last visited 
Apr. 1, 2014). 
68
 Duncan Adams, Did toxic stew cook the goose?, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Dec. 11, 1995), 
http://www.hcn.org/issues/49/1520 (last visited May 20, 2014). See also The Berkeley Pit: 
New fungal bacterial species call this deadly lake home, ATLAS OBSCURA (2013) 
http://www.atlasobscura.com/places/berkeley-pit (last visited May 20, 2014).  






runoff of eastern coal mines.69  SMCRA requires applicants for surface 
coal mining and reclamation permits to file a bond that will cover the costs 
of the reclamation plan “if the work has to be performed by the regulatory 
authority in the event of forfeiture”—at least $10,000 per permit.70  Bonds 
of this type are still not an absolute guarantee.  Unexpected conditions 
can cause reclamation costs to exceed the bond amount more quickly 
than regulators can require bond adjustments.71  It is also possible to lose 
bonds to surety insolvency if large numbers of mining companies default—
as occurred in the 1980s.72  Creative solutions can be (and have been) 
developed to some of these problems, leaving such bonds as regulators’ 
best guarantee of ultimate site reclamation.73 
SMCRA provides a fairly common-sense approach to prospectively 
funding environmental restoration at the end of a project’s life.  The bond 
approach is fair: it puts the cost of repairing environmental damage on the 
party that caused it, and it makes the liability known up front so it can be 
included in every stage of planning for a new project.  It does the best 
possible job of preventing evasion of liability by requiring payment at the 
beginning of the project.  And it doesn’t seem to have caused the 
annihilation of the coal-mining industry. Mine owners are capable of 
making the financial assurance thanks to the availability of surety bonds. 
A bond requirement would be one good way to carry out the 
proposal offered here for hydroelectric dams.  At the time of application for 
a new or renewed license, dam owners and FERC would engage in the 
process of evaluating potential future expenses for decommissioning.  A 
bond for that amount would then be required as a condition of the license.  
The requirement need not be applied retroactively to existing licenses, just 
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as SMCRA makes exceptions for certain existing coal rights.74  This 
should address concerns over unfairness for existing dam owners who 
accepted their current licenses without bond conditions.  Only owners who 
are not currently licensed (or are facing expiration of their license) will be 
required to file bonds, meaning the new or renewed license will not ever 
be accepted until this requirement is understood and met.  
This system also addresses some concerns over the uncertainty of 
future decommissioning costs.  While a comprehensive system should 
allow for future adjustment of bond amounts in the event of changed 
conditions, a licensee will at least know at any given time the full amount 
of its liability.  The drawback of this aspect, as noted with regard to mining, 
is that the bond could ultimately fail to cover the full costs of 
decommissioning if conditions change unexpectedly too close to the end 
of a license. Any legislative scheme would need to fully consider the pros 
and cons of this and other options, but the increased security of a bond 
may be a bargaining chip that would appeal to dam owners when faced 
with the prospect of an unknowable amount of future liability. 
F. Legislation Versus Rulemaking 
It may be that FERC already has the authority to require dam 
owners to commit to funding decommissioning as a condition of their 
license.  Congress has made explicit that FERC shall consider “the 
protection, mitigation of damage to, and enhancement of, fish and wildlife 
(including spawning grounds and habitat) . . . and the preservation of other 
aspects of environmental quality” when deciding whether or not to issue a 
license.75  On arguably even less-explicit authority,76 the U.S. Department 
of Agriculture promulgated regulations in 1974 designed to reduce 
environmental harm from mining on national forest land by requiring the 
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submissions of operation plans and bonds77 (subsequently upheld by the 
Ninth Circuit78).  But as discussed in Section E above, other mining bond 
requirements were passed shortly thereafter through legislation,79 
suggesting at least that both paths are potentially useful options. 
There are some advantages to legislation that make it particularly 
appealing for this proposal.  The first is that it avoids the kind of litigation 
that often follows [especially unpopular] rulemaking, allowing FERC to 
avoid the time and expense of defending its own ability to regulate.  
Second, legislation can address funding questions that administrative 
rulemaking cannot—for even a plan that places financial burden on 
industry will not come without any cost to government.80  Finally, 
legislation on this proposal would definitively accomplish a goal at which 
FERC is currently failing.  If it is true that FERC has this power already, 
then it is especially noteworthy that it does not exercise it.  Perhaps 
legislation is simply a necessary shove in the right direction for an agency 
pulling its punches.81 
CONCLUSION 
Despite all the environmental danger, it would be unfair not to 
acknowledge that the public experiences benefits from the existence of 
hydroelectric dams.  They allow us to enjoy reduced carbon emissions, 
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cheap power, and even recreational benefits created by reservoirs.82  
Regardless of that admitted public interest, full financial liability for dam 
decommissioning should remain with dam owners.  In reality, even this 
would not eliminate public cost sharing.  Dam owning power companies 
would know about the liability from the beginning of the license term and 
would pass on the anticipated expenses to customers in the form of higher 
rates.  But where public cost sharing is inevitable, my proposal places it on 
the specific members of the public who are also the direct beneficiaries of 
the positive impact of hydroelectric dams (those in the geographic vicinity 
of the dam), rather than on the national public at large. 
Further, despite the benefits to the local public of hydroelectric 
dams, the primary benefits continue to redound to the owner.  After 
building a dam, the owner enjoys thirty to fifty years of free use of a river’s 
kinetic energy to produce power for which it can charge its customers.  
Private dam owners receive distributed corporate profits, not the public.  In 
exchange for the rights that come with ownership, dam owners should 
also bear the costs of their business.  Those costs include the monetary 
expenses of removing a dam once a license expires and fails to be 
renewed, as well as the environmental expenses that are caused by the 
construction, presence, and destruction of the dam—expenses that are 
not themselves monetary, but that can be mitigated through monetary 
support for restoration.  
At the end of a dam’s life, someone will pay these costs.  It might 
be a government (and therefore taxpayers), the environment, or a private 
donor.  But to answer the original question posed: it should be the dam 
owner.  Owners are in the best position to predict the costs from the 
beginning of a project, and should therefore incorporate the expense of 
decommissioning into cost/benefit analyses and feasibility studies in 
deciding whether a dam project is a good investment.  Owners are also 
the parties best able to prepare for those expenses through their direct 
management of hydroelectric dam projects and the direct benefits they 
reap through their free use of kinetic energy and the rates they charge 
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customers for the power generated thereby.  The current scheme of piece-
meal funding for decommissioning projects is unpredictable, and places 
liability unfairly on governments and environments.  Congress should 
remedy these inequities by implementing this proposal, placing a 
requirement on FERC that it address decommissioning costs from the 
beginning of a license, and acquire financial assurances from dam owners 
to ensure that the environmental impacts of hydroelectric projects can be 
mitigated and remedied at the end of a dam’s life, at the sole expense of 
private owners.    







2013 Inflation Adjustment83 for Dam Removal Costs as Presented by 
Dam Removal Success Stories: Restoring Rivers Through Selective 
Removal of Dams that Don’t Make Sense, American Rivers (December 
1999). 
Baraboo River, Wisconsin – Waterworks Dam: 213,770 (1998) = 306,289.13 
(2013) 
Bear Creek, Oregon – Jackson Street Dam: 1.2 million (1998) = 1,719,357.06 
(2013) 
Cannon River, Minnesota – Welch Dam: 46,000 (1994) = 72,490.66 
Chipola River, Florida – Dead Lakes Dam: 32,000 (1987) = 65,787.61 (2013) 
Clearwater River, Idaho – Lewiston Dam: 633,428 (1973) = 3,331,859.81 (2013) 
Clyde River, Vermont – Newport No. 11 Dam: 550,000 (1996) = 818,676.23 
(2013) 
Colburn Creek, Idaho – Colburn Mill Pond Dam: 15,000 – 30,000 (1999) = 
22,500 (1999) = 31,541.33 (2013) 
Cold Creek, California – Lake Christopher Dam: 60,000 – 100,000 (1994) = 
80,000 (1994) = 126,070.72 (2013) 
Conestoga River, Pennsylvania – (Seven Dams): 1,500 – 110,000 (1997 – 1999) 
= 55,750 (1998) = 79,878.46 (2013) 
Evans Creek, Oregon – Alphonso Dam: 55,000 (1999) = 77,101.02 (2013) 
Juniata River, Pennsylvania – Williamsburg Station Dam: 150,000 (1996) = 
223,275.33 (2013) 
Kennebec River, Maine – Edwards Dam: 2.1 million (1999) = 2,943,857.14 
(2013) 
Kettle River, Minnesota – Sandstone Dam: 208,000 (1995) = 318,750.45 (2013) 
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Little Miami River, Ohio – Jacoby Road Dam: 10,000 (1997) = 14,551.15 (2013) 
Milwaukee River, Wisconsin – Woolen Mills Dam: 86,000 (1988) = 169,779.85 
(2013) 
Neuse River, North Carolina – Quaker Neck Dam: 205,500 (Dec 1997 – Sept 
1998) = 205,500 (1998) = 294,439.90 (2013) 
Ouzel Creek, Colorado – Bluebird Dam: 1.5 million (1989 – 1990) = 1.5 million 
(1990) = 2,680,329.00 (2013) 
Santa Fe River, New Mexico – Two-Mile Dam: 3.2 million (1994) = 5,042,828.61 
(2013) 
Souadabscook Stream, Maine – Grist Mill Dam: 56,000 (1998) = 80,236.66 
(2013) 
Walla Walla River, Oregon – Marie Dorian Dam: 30,000 + 15,000 (1997) = 
45,000 (1997) = 65,480.19 (2013) 
Whitestone Creek, Washington – Rat Lake Dam: 52,000 (1989) = 97,938.65 
(2013) 
Willow River, Wisconsin – Willow Falls Dam: 450,000 (1992) = 749,078.40 
(2013) 
Willow River, Wisconsin – Mounds Dam: 170,000 (1998) = 243,575.58 (2013) 
------ 
Total: 19,553,172.94 (2013) / 23 = 850,137.95 
Highest: 5,042,828.61 
Lowest: 14,551.15 
[NOTE: For any amounts or years that were given in a range, I used the 
average.] 
 
 
